SA in a rough neighbourhood and virtually unarmed
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A defence force is like insurance: asking for cover when the house is burning will not work; nor can an effective military be created when a threat appears. But threats can arise quickly. Consider the 1982 Falklands war, the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the 1996 Ugandan/Rwandan invasion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the 1998 Eritrea/Ethiopia war, rebels overrunning half of Mali in 2012, Seleka seizing power in the Central African Republic in 2013 and Russia seizing the Crimea in 2014. All erupted in a matter of days, not months.
By contrast, rebuilding a defence force takes years: new systems take a decade between order and service entry, then troops and officers must still learn how to employ them, and there is a limit to how many can be absorbed simultaneously. Educating, training and developing officers takes decades, not years, and shortcuts will be paid for in casualties.
Most countries try to maintain forces adequate and appropriate to counter existing and predictable threats, and with the adaptability, flexibility and agility to meet unexpected threats. That is sometimes termed the “minimum required force”, the strength and composition depending on the country’s vital and national interests and the threats and risks.
SA finds itself in a less than stable region at a time of great power competition. Vital interests include borders, air space and maritime zones; the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme; the Cahora Bassa power plant and the gas fields in Mozambique; and the Mozambique Channel, which carries most of the imported oil. National interests include Maputo port, trade along Africa’s coasts and a stable Southern African Development Community (Sadc) and Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter because those are potential markets; and because stable countries present fewer border problems.
Threats include the insurgency in northern Mozambique (threat to Cahora Bassa, the gas fields and risk of piracy in the channel), instability in Lesotho (risk of spillover and threat to the Highlands Scheme), instability in Eswatini or Zimbabwe (risk of spillover), terrorism and cyberattack as well as cross-border crime.
Less direct threats are the conflict in the DRC and instability along the Sadc periphery, which affect stability and undermine its economic prospects. And there is the risk that great power competition will play itself out in Africa, as it did during the cold war and colonial period.
There is also a real risk of an embassy being besieged or diplomats or ...
By contrast, rebuilding a defence force takes years: new systems take a decade between order and service entry, then troops and officers must still learn how to employ them, and there is a limit to how many can be absorbed simultaneously. Educating, training and developing officers takes decades, not years, and shortcuts will be paid for in casualties.
Most countries try to maintain forces adequate and appropriate to counter existing and predictable threats, and with the adaptability, flexibility and agility to meet unexpected threats. That is sometimes termed the “minimum required force”, the strength and composition depending on the country’s vital and national interests and the threats and risks.
SA finds itself in a less than stable region at a time of great power competition. Vital interests include borders, air space and maritime zones; the Lesotho Highlands Water Scheme; the Cahora Bassa power plant and the gas fields in Mozambique; and the Mozambique Channel, which carries most of the imported oil. National interests include Maputo port, trade along Africa’s coasts and a stable Southern African Development Community (Sadc) and Sub-Saharan Africa. The latter because those are potential markets; and because stable countries present fewer border problems.
Threats include the insurgency in northern Mozambique (threat to Cahora Bassa, the gas fields and risk of piracy in the channel), instability in Lesotho (risk of spillover and threat to the Highlands Scheme), instability in Eswatini or Zimbabwe (risk of spillover), terrorism and cyberattack as well as cross-border crime.
Less direct threats are the conflict in the DRC and instability along the Sadc periphery, which affect stability and undermine its economic prospects. And there is the risk that great power competition will play itself out in Africa, as it did during the cold war and colonial period.
There is also a real risk of an embassy being besieged or diplomats or ...